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Why the 1960 Lunch Counter Sit-Ins Worked: 
 A Case Study of Law and Social Movement Mobilization  
Christopher W. Schmidt* 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Article I present the student lunch counter sit-in movement of 1960 as 
a case study of effective social movement mobilization. Among the various factors 
that contributed to the success of the sit-ins, I focus on one in particular: the law. By 
focusing on law’s distinctive role in shaping the course of the protest movement and 
channeling reform efforts in ways that ultimately bolstered the students’ challenge 
to racial discrimination at southern lunch counters, I hope to raise some more general 
insights into the complex and sometimes surprising role of law in social movement 
mobilization.1 
Before venturing any further, I want to briefly elaborate on my use of the term 
“law.” I rely on a conception of law that is intentionally broad, drawn from law-and-
society scholars, rather than the narrower conception favored by legal academics. 
When I say that law merits more attention in our accounts of the sit-in movement, I 
mean more than simply considering whether existing law was on the side of the 
reformers or whether the courts sided with the protesters. Although these questions 
were obviously important, at times critically so, they do not encompass the totality of 
ways in which law affected the course of this particular protest movement. A narrow 
conception of law fails to explain, for instance, why for at least a decade after Brown 
v. Board of Education,2 when the law, as pronounced by the Supreme Court, was clear 
that state-mandated segregation in public schools violated the Constitution, schools 
remained segregated throughout the South,3 while the sit-ins achieved remarkable 
breakthroughs even when most courts rejected the claim that the Constitution 
prohibited operators of private businesses from discriminating based on race.4 To 
work through these and related puzzles, I turn to a socio-legal conception of law that 
captures other ways in which law influenced the civil rights movement.  
Specifically, I focus on two ways in which legal dynamics played a key role in 
the sit-in movement. One was through what socio-legal scholars have described as 
                                                        
*   Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; 
Faculty Fellow, American Bar Foundation. I would like to thank the members of the Indiana Journal of 
Law and Social Equality for their invitation to take part in the 2016 Symposium Toward Justice: Turning 
Points in Social Movements Past and Present and my fellow symposium participants for a day of engaging 
discussions and helpful feedback. 
1   This article discusses themes I explore in more depth in CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT, THE SIT-INS: 
PROTEST AND LEGAL CHANGE IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (forthcoming 2018).  
2   347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3   See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 49–52 
(1991).  
4   See generally Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 767 (2010). 
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legal consciousness,5 meaning, for my purposes, the assumptions non-lawyers had 
about the law and legal institutions. Although at the time of the sit-ins lawyers 
recognized that the courts had never recognized the students’ claimed right to 
nondiscriminatory service in a privately-operated eating facility that catered to the 
general public, the protesters themselves and many Americans believed that either 
the Constitution did recognize this kind of claim or that it should. This faith in the 
legitimacy of the students’ claim, not only as a matter of morality but also as a matter 
of legality, created critical support for the student protests. 
The other way in which law bolstered the effectiveness of the sit-ins was by 
structuring the opportunities for relevant actors to mobilize both for and against the 
students’ cause.6 The distinctive legal issues raised by the sit-ins ultimately operated 
to support the sit-in movement. They bolstered student mobilization efforts. They 
helped attract outside support for the movement. And they helped divide the 
opposition.  
In the following pages, I begin with an overview of the 1960 lunch counter sit-
in movement and the legal issues the protests raised. I then examine the ways in 
which the distinctive legal issues raised by the sit-ins contributed, in sometimes 
unexpected ways, to their success. I conclude with some thoughts on what the sit-in 
movement might offer for understanding the role of law in the successes and failures 
of other movements more generally. 
 
I. THE SIT-INS: HISTORY 
The sit-in movement began on the afternoon of Monday, February 1, 1960, 
when four African American students from the Agricultural and Technical College in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, sat down at the lunch counter of their local Woolworth 
store and asked to be served.7 The Greensboro Woolworth, like most department 
stores in the South, had a policy of serving only whites at the lunch counter. Refused 
service, the four students sat quietly in their seats until closing. The following 
morning the students returned to the lunch counter, this time with sixteen friends. 
                                                        
5   See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 
29–30 (1998); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG 
WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 1 (1990); Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experience 
and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About Law and Street Harassment, 34 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 1055, 1055 
(2000); Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the 
Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES 342, 343–44 (1990); Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 
1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323, 356 (2005). 
6    See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION (1994); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on 
LGBT Rights, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 151, 159 (2009); Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 715 (1992); Doug NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011). 
7   The summary of the Greensboro sit-ins in this paragraph draws on the following sources: WILLIAM H. 
CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR 
FREEDOM 79–101 (1980); MILES WOLFF, LUNCH AT THE 5 & 10 (rev. ed., 1990); Daniel H. Pollitt, Dime 
Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of the First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315, 317–37; 
Michael Walzer, A Cup of Coffee and a Seat, 7 DISSENT 111 (Spring 1960). 
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Again they were refused service, and again they remained seated in silent protest. 
The students were back the next day—this time occupying nearly all the forty seats 
at the Woolworth’s counter. By the end of the week, an estimated two hundred 
students had taken part in the Greensboro protests. The protests attracted the 
attention of white youths, who began their own counter-protests. The scene at the 
Woolworth’s on Saturday included white teenagers waving Confederate flags and 
taunting the Black college students sitting at the lunch counter. The police emptied 
the store after the store manager received a bomb threat. When the store reopened 
two days later, the lunch counter remained closed. At this point, city leaders 
persuaded the students to call a moratorium on their protests. 
Greensboro was not the first time African Americans protested discriminatory 
service policies in restaurants by staging peaceful “sit-in” demonstrations. In the 
1940s, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), a newly formed interracial 
organization committed to nonviolent protest, led restaurant sit-ins in Chicago.8 Over 
the course of the 1950s, CORE organized sit-ins in cities in the North as well as the 
upper South; in 1959, it organized a series of sit-ins in Miami. 9 The NAACP Youth 
Council launched a lunch counter sit-in campaign in the late 1950s that began in 
Oklahoma City and spread to cities across the Midwest.10  
Yet these earlier protests were largely localized and short-lived affairs. The 
1960 Greensboro protests sparked a larger protest movement. 
The sit-ins were first picked up by African American college and high school 
students in other North Carolina cities.11 On February 8, students sat in at lunch 
counters in Durham and Winston-Salem; the next day there were protests in 
Charlotte and Raleigh. On February 11, Hampton, Virginia, became the first city 
outside North Carolina to join the movement. The following day, the student 
demonstrations extended further into the South when some 100 protesters took part 
in a demonstration in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The sit-ins were now national news: 
the New York Times put the Rock Hill protest on its front page. 12  Students in 
Nashville, Tennessee, soon joined the movement, as did students in Tallahassee, 
Florida. Both cities had student groups that had been carefully planning their own 
sit-in protests months before Greensboro. Upon being arrested and convicted, 
Nashville and Tallahassee protesters found a new way to expand their protest: they 
chose to serve jail sentences rather than paying a fine.  
                                                        
8   AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOT RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1942–1968, at 3–14 
(1973). 
9   Id. at 91, 102. 
10   See THOMAS L. BYNUM, NAACP YOUTH AND THE FIGHT FOR BLACK FREEDOM, 1936–1965, at 95–99 (2013); 
GRETCHEN CASSEL EICK, DISSENT IN WICHITA: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE MIDWEST, 1954–72, at 
1–11 (2001); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES 
ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 188–94 (1984); Ronald Walters, The Great Plains Sit-In Movement, 1958–
1960, 16 GREAT PLAINS Q. 85 (Spring 1996).  
11   The material in this paragraph is drawn from SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at ch. 1. 
12   Claude Sitton, Negroes’ Protest Spreads in South, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1960, at 1, 6. 
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By the end of February, thirty cities in seven states had sit-in 
demonstrations.13 By the end of the spring, sit-ins had taken place in all thirteen 
southern states and, according to one estimate, involved some 50,000 protesters.14 
What had begun as a bold act of frustration by four college students turned into a 
full-fledged protest movement. Greensboro had set in motion an escalating series of 
events that would move a nation. 
Soon after the protests began, students began to see tangible results as a 
growing number of restaurants desegregated in the face of the protests.15 These early 
victories were sometimes the product of an individual restaurant owner’s decision 
and sometimes the product of negotiated city-wide agreements among local officials 
and business leaders. By the end of the spring, lunch counters in eleven cities had 
begun to desegregate under pressure from sit-in protests.16 Although these victories 
were more a steady trickle than the wave of reform the students were hoping for, and 
although they did not penetrate into the Deep South, they were generally understood 
to be a remarkable achievement for a movement that seemingly sprang out of 
nowhere. “Buried in the reams of copy about the southern sit-ins,” noted a Congress 
of Racial Equality newsletter in April 1960, “is the fact that since the protest 
movement started, over 100 lunch counters and eating places in various parts of the 
South have started to serve everybody regardless of color.”17 Victories over racial 
discrimination attracted attention, gave the protests an air of achievement, and 
pulled more and more people into the movement. The summer of 1960 saw a number 
of new additions to the list of cities that had desegregated their lunch counters in 
response to the protests—bringing the total to twenty-seven 18 —as operators of 
targeted stores took advantage of the slowing or cessation of protests when school 
was not in session to make changes as inconspicuously as possible.19 “No store in the 
South which has opened its lunch counters to Negroes has reported a loss of 
business,” one widely publicized report noted.20 “Managers have reported business as 
usual or noted an increase . . . . Negroes have not congregated to demonstrate a 
victory. . . . White customers have observed the change calmly for the most part . . . 
.”21  
The student sit-in movement of 1960 reshaped and reinvigorated the struggle 
for racial equality. The sit-ins marked a new phase of the civil rights movement, one 
in which mass participatory direct-action protest would become the leading edge of 
the movement’s demand for social and political change. This new phase was led by 
                                                        
13   JAMES H. LAUE, DIRECT ACTION AND DESEGREGATION, 1960–1962: TOWARD A THEORY OF RATIONALIZATION 
OF PROTEST 76 (1989). 
14   Id. at 77. 
15   See SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at ch. 1. 
16   See LAUE, supra note 13, at 77; NORTH CAROLINA COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS, A FOLLOW-UP REPORT 
ON THE STUDENT PROTEST MOVEMENT AFTER TWO MONTHS 2–4. 
17   Editorial, CORE Members Arrested, CORE-LATOR, Apr. 1960, at 1. 
18   Lunch Counter Pressure Cracks South, CHI. DEFENDER, Aug. 20, 1960, at 20. 
19   See LAUE, supra note 13, at 88.  
20   Margaret Price, Why Some Areas Solve ‘Sit-Ins,’ CHI. DEFENDER, July 2, 1960, at 8. 
21   Id. 
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activists who were younger, less patient, and less willing to compromise than the 
older generation of civil rights activists.22 The sit-in movement elevated the role of 
women in the civil rights movement. In contrast to the male-dominated, established 
civil rights organizations, the decentralized mass protest movement offered 
opportunities for women not only to participate but often to assume leadership roles. 
The sit-in movement also led to the creation of an influential new civil rights 
organization, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which grew 
out of an April 1960 meeting of student protest leaders.23 SNCC’s challenge to the 
established ways of civil rights reform and the established civil rights organizations 
initiated a cycle of tensions, breaks, and alliances between the youth activists and 
the older generation—with Martin Luther King, Jr., often operating as an 
intermediary between the two sides—that continued into the 1960s.24 
The student sit-in movement also transformed the agenda of the national 
civil rights debate. Prior to 1960, racial discrimination in privately-owned public 
accommodations was far from the top of the agenda of most civil rights 
organizations. The sit-ins changed this. The protests sparked a national debate over 
the legality and morality of discrimination in public accommodations—one that 
would only increase in volume and intensity in the coming years. A right to 
nondiscriminatory access to lunch counters and hotels, regardless of whether they 
were publicly or privately owned, now had a place alongside school desegregation, 
voting rights, and workplace rights as the central goals of the larger civil rights 
movement.25  
 
II. THE SIT-INS: THE LEGAL ISSUES 
A claimed right to nondiscriminatory service at a lunch counter raised legal 
questions that were distinct in significant and consequential ways from other major 
targets of the civil rights movement. Following the Supreme Court’s 1954 school 
desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education,26 a ruling the Court in short 
order extended to all public facilities,27 the primary thrust of civil rights activity was 
a demand for enforcement of the law. In the face of southern state defiance of Brown, 
lawyers and activists demanded federal enforcement of the law of the land. The 
Freedom Rides of 1961 sought to test a Supreme Court ruling that interpreted federal 
                                                        
22   See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 10, at 188–94. 
23   See CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S, 19–30 (2d. ed. 
1995). 
24   See, e.g., TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 133–74 (2011). 
25   See generally SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at ch. 3. 
26   347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
27   E.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (parks); 
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per 
curiam) (golf courses); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per 
curiam) (beaches). 
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law to require the desegregation of interstate travel facilities. 28  Voting rights 
campaigns targeted southern practices that defied federal constitutional and 
statutory law.29 The sit-ins were different.  
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, no federal law regulated service in public 
accommodations. The key question in 1960 was whether the Constitution limited the 
ability of lunch counter operators to racially discriminate. The targeted lunch 
counters were privately owned, and according to longstanding constitutional 
doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment required only “state actors” to follow the racial 
nondiscrimination requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.30 Lunch counter 
operators, unlike others whose racially discriminatory decisions were targeted by 
civil rights activists, such as school board members or voting registrars, were not 
employees of the state. Yet these lunch counters purported to serve the general 
public. Indeed, most were located in department stores that allowed African 
American customers to purchase items elsewhere in the store and many allowed 
African Americans to order food—as long as they did not sit at the “whites-only” lunch 
counter. The line between “private” discrimination and state-sanctioned 
discrimination became blurrier still when the lunch counter operator called upon the 
police to press trespassing charges against African American protesters who sat at 
their lunch counters and refused to leave when denied service.31  
When it came to access to public accommodations, civil rights lawyers never 
won the constitutional breakthrough in the Supreme Court they had hoped for.32 Yet 
the litigation that emerged from the sit-ins did result in a string of important legal 
victories on narrower grounds.33 Legislatures also responded. Although the Deep 
South remained intransigent, authorities elsewhere passed public accommodations 
laws and strengthened enforcement of existing ones. By 1964, a majority of the nation 
lived under state or local laws requiring nondiscriminatory access to public 
                                                        
28   See generally RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDES: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
(2006). 
29   See, e.g., RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK 
ENFRANCHISEMENT 173–98 (2004). 
30   See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883); Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: 
The Case of the State Action Doctrine, 2016 BYU L. REV. 575, 584–93 (2016). 
31   When sit-in protesters were arrested and prosecuted, the state was obviously involved. A constitutional 
question for the courts, then, was whether the state violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment when it enforced a law that does not discriminate on its face, such as an anti-
trespassing statute, if that law was being used by a non-state actor for racially discriminatory 
purposes. The seminal case in which this kind of enforcement question was raised was Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
32   For an analysis of this issue, see SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at ch. 5; Schmidt, supra note 4. 
33   See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Barr v. 
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Gober v. City of 
Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Shuttlesworth v. City 
of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of 
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 
157 (1961). 
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accommodation. 34  Then, with Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 35  non-
discrimination in public accommodations became national policy. What, in the spring 
of 1960, had been the most volatile civil rights issues of the day would become, within 
a matter of years, a broadly accepted norm of conduct for the nation. 36 
 
III. WHY DID THE SIT-INS WORK? 
The goal of this article is to show the law’s critical role in making the sit-ins 
such an effective social movement. Before demonstrating this point, however, it is 
important to recognize that many of the reasons the sit-ins spread so quickly were 
not directly traceable to legal dynamics.  
Key to the diffusion of the sit-ins, for instance, was the nature of the protest 
action, which was easily communicated and replicated. The genius of the lunch 
counter sit-in was its simplicity. As a protest tactic, it was straightforward and easily 
replicated. The clear and powerful message the protesters sought to convey could be 
conveyed through nothing more than an image. A photograph of a group of well-
dressed African American college students sitting unserved at a lunch counter said it 
all.37 A key strength of the movement was what sociologist Doug McAdam describes 
as the “accessibility” of the protest tactic.38 Unlike, say, a bus boycott or an effort to 
desegregate a school, a sit-in could be launched by a small group anywhere there was 
a segregated lunch counter.39 
The tactic of the sit-in protests allowed for an immediate sense of 
accomplishment for the students. Many different outcomes could be seen as an 
achievement. Being part of this new, defiant movement was an achievement. Simply 
creating student-run organizations that would strategize and coordinate sit-in 
protests might be cited as a “gain” for the movement. According to one observer, the 
sit-in “Workshop” not only trained students on the mechanism of a lunch counter 
protest, it also functioned as a “cohesive, morale-building mechanism which served 
to infuse an ideology into the Negro student participants.”40 Students even saw going 
to jail as a critically important experience for the individual protester and for the 
                                                        
34   See Bell, 378 U.S. at 284 (Douglas, J., concurring) (listing the contemporary state public accommodations 
laws at the time of the case); William E. Blundell, 30 States, Some Cities Bar Discrimination in Public 
Accommodations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1963, at 1, 14; Survey Shows Rights Laws Now Cover 65% of 
Nation,” WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1963, at A17.  
35   Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a). 
36   On the largely successful implementation of Title II, see CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE 
EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 245–49 (2014); Alexander M. Bickel, What Has Been Done is 
Prologue, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 9, 1965, at 16–17; John Herbers, Whites Say Compliance Has Been 
Achieved with Little Strife, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1965, at 1; Peter Millones, Negroes in South Test Rights 
Act; Resistance Light, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1964, at 1. 
37  See, e.g., A Brief history of the Sit-In Movement, TIME, 
http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1957689_2030666,00.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
38   Doug McAdam, Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 735, 743 (1983). 
39   See ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: IDEOLOGIES, INTERESTS, AND IDENTITIES 226–28 (1993). 
40   Martin Oppenheimer, The Southern Student Movement: Year 1, 33 J. NEGRO EDUC. 396, 399 (1964).  
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larger movement.41 The students transformed the very response that segregationists 
saw as their greatest weapon against the protesters—the police officer, the paddy 
wagon, the jail cell—into a victory for the protesters. 
Also key were the channels of communication—such as churches, racial justice 
organizations, and colleges—by which news of the protests spread.42  
But alongside these factors, law also played a key role, which has not been fully 
appreciated in histories of the sit-ins. In the following section I identify several ways 
in which the law functioned to strengthen the sit-in movement. 
 
A. An Open Field 
The legal situation in 1960 shaped the students’ choice of target. Racial 
discrimination at lunch counters and other public accommodations, although integral 
to the civil rights movement in the years after the sit-ins, was not a central concern 
for racial justice groups prior to 1960. In part this was because civil rights lawyers 
saw other targets as more vulnerable to legal challenge. They recognized the 
distinctively difficult legal dilemmas raised by privately operated businesses that 
served the public and focused their energies elsewhere. Few of the students 
appreciated the concerns about constitutional doctrine that steered civil rights 
organizations away from challenging discriminatory lunch counter service in the 
South. What they knew was that this was an offensive practice and no one seemed to 
be doing anything about it. Among the students themselves and among outside 
sympathizers, the sit-ins resonated in large part because it was clear that this was 
the students’ protest, which was not being orchestrated by far away civil rights 
strategists or radical ideologues.43  
Thus, one of the great strengths of the sit-in movement was that it targeted a 
realm of racial injustice that, at the time, was basically not on the agendas of the 
major civil rights organizations. The students found an issue that they could claim as 
their own. They were not simply joining a battle that the older generation of civil 
rights activists were already waging. They were striking out on their own, finding 
new points of vulnerability in the edifice of Jim Crow and locating new targets that 
resonated with their particular concerns and that aligned with their particular 
sources of strength. To the surprise of participants and observers of the sit-in 
movement, lunch counters proved to be a powerfully resonant platform for protest 
activities and, often, a target that was ripe for desegregation breakthroughs. As the 
sit-ins took off, established civil rights organizations quickly moved challenges to 
segregation in public accommodations to the top of their reform agendas.44  
                                                        
41   See Christopher W. Schmidt, Divided by Law: The Sit-Ins and the Role of the Courts in the Civil Rights 
Movement, 33 L. & HIST. REV. 93, 127–29 (2015). 
42   On the “diffusion” of the sit-in movement across the South, see MORRIS, supra note 10, at 188–215; 
OBERSCHALL, supra note 39, at 225–28; McAdam, supra note 38; Kenneth T. Andrews & Michael Biggs, 
The Dynamics of Protest Diffusion: Movement Organizations, Social Networks, and News Media in the 
1960 Sit-Ins, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 752 (2006). 
43   See Schmidt, supra note 41, at 137–38 (discussing accusations that the sit-in movement was 
orchestrated by Communists and why they failed to gain much traction).  
44  Id. at 101–02. 
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B. Attracting External Support 
1. Civil Rights Lawyers  
At the start of the sit-ins, the students benefited from having the NAACP 
focused on issues other than lunch counters. Once the movement got underway, 
however, they benefited from having respected civil rights lawyers proclaiming the 
students’ cause constitutionally justified. These statements further entrenched the 
idea, already assumed among many civil rights sympathizers, that lunch counters 
were a logical next step in the battle to give full meaning to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Even for those students who feared the co-opting of their cause by civil 
rights lawyers, being told that they had the law—and assumedly the Supreme 
Court—behind them surely did not hurt. Having the NAACP on their side could only 
bolster the legitimacy of the students’ cause in the public eye. 
The NAACP’s embrace of the student movement also had tangible benefits. 
Funding was essential to the continued survival of the sit-in movement. For all the 
attention and controversy over the “jail, no bail” protest tactic, most arrested 
protesters had no interest in sitting in jail if it could be avoided and were thankful 
when there were funds to pay bail and fines. “[T]he N.A.A.C.P continues to have the 
loyalty of most students, who admit that after they dash ahead they often have to ask 
the N.A.A.C.P for legal help,” explained one journalist after spending time with the 
protesters.45 The NAACP was the best positioned among the civil rights organizations 
to assume the role of providing financial and legal assistance to the student 
movement. In late June, the NAACP reported that it was participating in the legal 
defense of 1,763 students who had been arrested for taking part in the 
demonstrations and that it had paid more than $44,000 in fines and put up $100,000 
in bail on their behalf.46 
 
2. NAACP Critics 
The sit-ins responded to the desire many Americans felt for a new path forward 
on the race question, one centered on sacrifice and moral suasion rather than 
adversarial litigation and court orders. The students were far from alone in their 
frustration with the NAACP and litigation-based reform strategies. By 1960, with the 
NAACP’s school desegregation campaign largely stalled, many civil rights proponents 
were eager to embrace alternative approaches to bringing down Jim Crow. The 
NAACP had always had its critics on the left, and the slow progress of the 
implementation of Brown strengthened their voices. Those who viewed the NAACP 
as elitist and overly cautious embraced the sit-in movement as a way to attack the 
NAACP and its commitment to litigation and lobbying as the primary tools of racial 
                                                        
45   Ben H. Bagdikian, Negro Youth’s New March on Dixie, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Sept. 8, 1962, at 18. 
46   Elsie Carper, Youths in Rally for Civil Rights, WASH. POST, TIMES HERALD, June 23, 1960, at B9.  
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change. 47  In a widely-discussed article in Harper’s Magazine, African American 
journalist Louis E. Lomax praised the students for displacing the “Negro leadership 
class”—most notably the NAACP—as “the prime mover of the Negro’s social revolt.”48 
For Martin Luther King Jr., the sit-ins demonstrated that the tactics of non-
violent, direct-action protest could actually work. King described the sit-ins as 
“following the same philosophy and techniques as the Montgomery bus boycotts”—
the 1955–56 protest campaign that King organized, which first brought the young 
Black minister to the nation’s attention—and suggested that the sit-ins had provided 
“the answer to how we can meet delaying tactics that come through litigation.”49 In 
describing the value of nonviolent protest, King posed the rhetorical question, “Does 
this bring results?” 50  His first piece of evidence to demonstrate the efficacy of 
“creative protest” was the sit-ins: “In less than a year, lunch counters have been 
integrated in more than 142 cities of the Deep South, and this was done without a 
single court suit.”51 
Racial moderates—individuals and groups who generally supported the anti-
discrimination goals of the civil rights movement but counseled tactical caution in 
achieving these goals—also used the sit-ins to launch a critique of the NAACP and 
its approach to civil rights. Although some moderates believed the sit-in protest 
unnecessarily confrontational and disruptive,52 many others praised the students for 
showing the potential of moral persuasion and negotiation as an alternative to 
litigation battles. Whereas dedicated racial justice activists like King felt the sit-ins 
showed that litigation-centered strategies were too slow, too cautious, and too reliant 
on elite leadership, moderates used the protests as an opportunity to criticize 
litigation as unnecessarily divisive. They argued that the backlash against Brown 
and the failure to desegregate southern schools showed the limits of court victories 
that face widespread social opposition. “No argument in a court of law could have 
dramatized the immorality and irrationality of such a custom as did the sit-ins,” 
wrote Atlanta Constitution editor Ralph McGill.53  “Not even the Supreme Court 
decision on the schools in 1954 had done this. . . . The central moral problem was 
enlarged.”54 “[T]he approach in Christian charity and love of neighbor, is the only 
                                                        
47   See, e.g., Howard Zinn, Finishing School for Pickets, NATION, Aug. 6, 1960, at 71–73; Nat Hentoff, A 
Peaceful Army, COMMONWEAL, June 10, 1960, 275. 
48   Louis E. Lomax, The Negro Revolt Against “The Negro Leader”, HARPER’S MAG., June 1, 1960, at 41. 
49   King Looks to Georgia Cafe Push, ATL. CONST., Feb. 23, 1960, at 7. 
50   Martin Luther King, Jr., The American Dream, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 214 (James M. Washington, ed., 1986).  
51   Id. See also Claude Sitton, Dr. King Favors Buyers’ Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1960, at 15 (praising 
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NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 494 (2016).  
52   See, e.g., Hodding Carter, The Young Negro is a New Negro, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 1, 1960, at 11. 
53   RALPH MCGILL, THE SOUTH AND THE SOUTHERNER 17 (1963). 
54   Id. 
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answer,” explained Father Ernest L. Unterkoefler of Richmond, Virginia, in a radio 
discussion of the sit-ins; “Laws will not solve our problems.”55  
Leaders of the Southern Regional Council, a prominent voice of southern 
liberalism and a strong supporter of the sit-ins, shared this skepticism toward 
litigation and top-down legal change. By “appeal[ing] to conscience and self-interest 
instead of law,” the students brought a desperately needed, fresh approach to the 
problem of racial discrimination, one SRC report explained.56 “They have argued on 
the basis of moral right and supported that argument with economic pressure. By 
their action they have given the South an excellent opportunity to settle one facet of 
a broad problem by negotiation and good will instead of court order.”57 A resolution 
brought about by “economic pressures and civic sense of responsibility . . . would quite 
likely be a better settlement than one hammered out through litigation in already 
over-burdened courts.” 58  Judicial proclamations were limited in their ability to 
change hearts and minds, these racial moderates insisted. Protests—at least certain 
kinds of protests, like the lunch counter sit-ins—may be more effective at changing 
views. 
3. Mainstream Political Figures 
The experience of Brown v. Board of Education and the national struggle over 
the meaning of the Constitution’s principle of equal protection that followed 
encouraged many Americans, in what seemed an almost instinctive move, to see the 
sit-ins as a constitutional issue. The six-year experience with school desegregation as 
a constitutional issue allowed for this intuitive transformation of the sit-ins into a 
constitutional issue to which the logic of Brown’s desegregation principle seemed to 
apply. “It seems clear that this ‘lunch-counter movement’ will become a historic 
milestone in the American Negro’s efforts to win the rights of citizenship which are 
guaranteed him by the Constitution,” declared Commonweal magazine.59 
In explaining Brown’s role in defining the issues of concern and the terms of 
debate for the sit-ins, particularly relevant are the rulings that followed Brown in 
which the Court, in terse, unsigned “per curiam” decisions, extended the 
                                                        
55   Protestant-Jewish-Roman Catholic Conversation on the Sit-Ins, PRESBYTERIAN OUTLOOK, Mar. 21, 1960, 
at 6.  
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31, 1960, NAACP Papers (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Part III, Series A, 
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57   Id. 
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MOVEMENT, WINTER 1960, Mar. 14, 1960, NAACP Papers (on file with the Library of Congress, 
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constitutional prohibition of segregation to public parks, auditoriums, golf courses, 
beaches, and buses.60 By the time of the sit-ins, the Court’s refutation of the separate-
but-equal principle had moved beyond schools into all areas of public life that fell 
under direct state control. The question for many civil rights supporters, then, was 
whether this trend would eventually encompass restaurants and hotels and other 
public accommodations whose purpose was to serve the general public. As the sit-ins 
spread across the South, conservative New York Times columnist Arthur Krock 
apprehensively wrote, “The grounds of the 1954 ruling [in Brown] are so broad that 
the court might find room for a decision that, regardless of damaged private-property 
values, police protection could not be given the discriminatory lunch rooms when the 
sit-in protests were peacefully registered.”61 
These developments convinced many observers that the principle animating 
Brown applied to public accommodations. A generation of shifts in constitutional 
doctrine by the Supreme Court had destabilized any comfortable assumptions about 
the reach of the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination, thereby giving an 
opening in the public discourse in which the claim embodied by the students in their 
sit-in protests could be understood as a viable challenge to existing conceptions of the 
limits of the Equal Protection Clause—that is, a challenge to traditional conceptions 
of state action. 
The application of the Brown principle to public accommodations was 
commonplace in the months and years following the sit-ins. One of the most 
influential proponents of this position was King, who urged the student protesters to 
see the sit-ins as the logical extension of the school segregation struggle. He echoed 
the famous words of Chief Justice Warren’s Brown opinion when he told the students 
that “[s]eparate facilities, whether in eating places or public schools, are inherently 
unequal.”62 When one of his interviewers noted during a March 1960 appearance on 
NBC’s Sunday morning news show Meet the Press that “there have been court 
decisions saying that a storekeeper can select his customers,” King insisted that 
Brown meant “that segregation is wrong even in lunch counters and public places 
because that decision said in substance that segregation generates a feeling of 
inferiority within the segregated and, thereby, it breaches the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”63 He added hopefully, “I’m sure that if we follow this 
through in this area the same thing will follow.”64 
While such statements by leading civil rights advocates are best understood as 
claims for a reformed vision of justice bolstered by an aspirational claim on the 
Constitution, the striking point is that the implication of these kinds of statements—
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that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the students’ actions—echoed throughout 
the discussions of the sit-ins. And they often came from unexpected quarters. 
When asked about the sit-ins at a press conference, President Eisenhower, not 
generally recognized as a strong ally of the cause of civil rights, seemed to assume 
the students had the Constitution on their side. He noted that demonstrations, if 
orderly and seeking to support the rights of equality, were constitutional and that 
“[m]y own understanding is that when an establishment belongs to the public, opened 
under public charter and so on, that equal fights are involved.”65 His comments 
highlight the fact that the constitutional claims raised by the sit-ins were, at 
minimum, viable in public discourse. The students had effectively destabilized any 
certainty that the Brown decision did not logically entail the desegregation of 
restaurants. Even a president notoriously reluctant to publicly endorse Brown was 
inclined to not only express support for the students but to view the issue as 
implicating basic constitutional principles. 
The assumption that the lunch counter sit-ins involved a valid constitutional 
claim was also encouraged by the fact that students did not just target privately 
operated public accommodations. Students sat-in at government-operated facilities, 
such as courthouse cafeterias66 or public libraries,67 where existing judicial doctrine 
unquestionably protected their claimed right to non-discriminatory treatment. 
Lawyers versed in the state action doctrine recognized a sit-in at a courthouse 
cafeteria and a sit-in at a Woolworth lunch counter as raising distinct legal claims. 
To protesters and most observers, however, the distinction was less clear.  
Whether knowingly or not, sit-in movement participants worked an incredibly 
powerful trick: by juxtaposing an aspirational constitutional claim—the right to 
nondiscriminatory access to a privately operated business that served the public—
alongside judicially recognized constitutional claims—such as the right to 
nondiscriminatory access to state-operated facilities—they leveraged the latter to 
strengthen the former. The sit-in movement offered, in effect, a familiar lawyer’s 
technique: argument by analogy. Movement activists took what was, as a matter of 
constitutional doctrine, a significant gap between two quite different legal claims and 
reframed it, as a matter of public discourse, into the same basic issue. 
This trend toward treating racial discrimination in public accommodations as 
a constitutional issue only strengthened in the following years. In February 1963, 
President Kennedy gave an address in which he said, “No act is more contrary to the 
spirit of our democracy and Constitution—or more rightfully resented by a Negro 
citizen who seeks only equal treatment—than the barring of that citizen from 
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restaurants, hotels, theaters, recreational areas and other public accommodations 
and facilities.”68 Later that spring, in announcing his support for federal civil rights 
legislation, Kennedy declared the “right to be served in facilities which are open to 
the public” was an “elementary right,” comparable to education and voting.69 “We are 
confronted primarily with a moral issue,” he explained. “It is as old as the scriptures 
and is as clear as the American Constitution.”70 The public accommodations provision 
of the proposed civil rights bill, he asserted in the following month, would protect “the 
basic constitutional rights of an individual to be treated as a free and equal human 
being.”71 
Although Congress primarily relied on the Commerce Clause in passing the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 72  and although the Supreme Court upheld the public 
accommodations provision of the law on that basis,73 many at the time believed the 
Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to desegregate public 
accommodations. 74  The law “has a simple purpose,” explained Senator Hubert 
Humphrey on the floor of the Senate. “That purpose is to give fellow citizens—
Negroes—the same rights and opportunities that white people take for granted. This 
is no more than what was preached by the prophets, and by Christ Himself. It is no 
more than what our Constitution guarantees.”75 Upon signing the Civil Rights Act 
into law, President Lyndon Johnson said of the “unequal treatment” that the law 
targeted, “Our Constitution, the foundation of our Republic, forbids it. The principles 
of our freedom forbid it. Morality forbids it. And the law I will sign tonight forbids 
it.”76 
As a claim pressed upon national opinion and the political branches of 
government, the students’ actions offered, in effect, a persuasive reinterpretation of 
the scope of the equal protection of the law. By protesting at privately-owned lunch 
counters, at municipal pools, in bus terminals, in the libraries, and in other publicly 
owned places, and by arguing that segregation in all these places raised the same 
fundamental concerns about dignity and citizenship, the protesters were making a 
case to the larger society that the principle of equal protection entailed a government 
responsibility to stand on the side of those combating the most egregious 
manifestations of Jim Crow, regardless of whether existing constitutional doctrine 
delineated these acts as “private” or not. 
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C. Dividing Opposition 
The contested legal issues also contributed to divisions among defenders of 
segregation. Those who stood opposed to the students’ claims differed on the strength 
of their commitment to segregation, on the lengths they were willing to go to protect 
segregation, and on the role that the police and courts should play in this struggle.  
Divisions among southern whites were particularly consequential in the sit-in 
movement because of the distinctive legal issues involved. In other episodes in the 
civil rights struggle, law often operated to minimize divisions among segregationists. 
This was the case with the backlash against Brown, for example. State leaders who 
led the opposition against Brown effectively minimized divisions on school 
desegregation among white southerners by a legal maneuver: they removed power 
from localities and consolidated authority to the state level, where the segregationist 
cause could be more carefully strategized and managed.77 Ultimately a relatively 
small number of leaders—leaders who saw political advantage in defending 
segregation—controlled the white South’s stand against school desegregation.78  
This kind of legal option was unavailable when it came to the sit-ins. The sit-
ins targeted not state institutions but thousands of private businesses. These 
businesses decided whom to serve; they decided whether to press charges against sit-
in protesters. The legal factor that made the constitutional claim of the sit-in 
protesters such a challenge to existing equal protection doctrine in the courts—the 
fact that these were private businesses—also made mobilizing in opposition to the 
sit-ins much more difficult. 
A related way in which legal factors amplified divisions among white 
southerners was what might be described as a misalignment between incentives and 
authority.79 Because official state segregation policy was no longer constitutionally 
permissible after Brown, store managers were the ones who needed to start the legal 
process. Private business owners were to bear the responsibility for calling upon the 
law to maintain Jim Crow. This was a burden that, by the spring of 1960, many, 
perhaps most, lunch counter operators, regardless of their personal beliefs on 
segregation, were not enthusiastic to shoulder. 
Lunch counter operators were businessmen first and foremost. They wanted to 
make a profit, and they viewed themselves as catering to their clients’ preferences, 
not dictating them. The store managers faced a classic collective action problem: if 
others integrated, then a store manager would fall into line, thankful, in many cases, 
to simply have the controversy resolved; but no single store wanted to be the first to 
integrate.80  
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While many students were arrested, prosecuted, and often fined or sent to jail, 
the overwhelming majority of those who participated in the sit-ins were not.81 When 
faced with a group of protesters who refused to leave, the most common response by 
restaurant operators was to shut down their lunch counters. 82  Most business 
operators simply wanted the protests to go away. They wanted to make money, and 
the sit-ins were preventing them from doing that. Sending potential paying customers 
off to jail was not good business, a point that the business owners regularly made 
when asked why they were unwilling to call the police and have the protesters 
charged with trespassing on private property. Many assumed (or hoped) the sit-ins 
were nothing more than a college prank that would soon blow over.83 
White local political leaders in urban areas of the upper South and in major 
cities throughout the rest of the South had their own incentives to consider. They 
lived in communities where African Americans voted in significant numbers and 
where the growing Black middle class held economic sway through both Black-owned 
businesses and Black patronage of white businesses.84 White political leaders also 
sought to portray their communities as more progressive on racial issues, so as to 
better attract coveted economic investment from outside the South.85 As a result, 
local leaders usually searched for a conciliatory approach to the sit-ins. Whether they 
expressed their support for one side or the other, mayors urged negotiation and 
compromise as a way to deal with the issue and put an end to the protests. Mayors 
were limited, however, in their authority to deal with the situation. Like many lunch 
counter operators, they too felt a sense of helplessness in the face of the sit-ins. They 
could not force the students to stop; they could not force the businesses to desegregate; 
and they could not force the counter-protesters to stay home. When faced with the 
pressure from demonstrators on the one side and their business community on the 
other, mayors often shifted responsibility (and blame) by creating committees of 
leading local citizens, usually including African American leaders, who were charged 
with studying and resolving the issue.86 
In contrast, those who most wanted to use the law to crack down on the 
students—police and state-level officials—were often disabled by legal constraints 
from doing so. From the perspective of the police, the law that they were empowered 
to enforce was agnostic when it came to racial discrimination in public 
accommodations. Although many southern states and localities still had segregation 
laws on the books, the police rarely tried to enforce them. In light of Brown and 
subsequent Supreme Court rulings striking down government-compelled segregation 
beyond public schools, even the most biased southern judge would have trouble in 
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1960 trying to enforce a law requiring racial discrimination in eating facilities. 
Although civil rights opponents sometimes referenced segregation laws to threaten 
protesters,87  no sit-in protester (as far as I know) was charged with violating a 
segregation statute. Since there were no legal requirements in any southern state 
that lunch counters refrain from racial discrimination, as there were in many 
northern states and localities that were covered by public accommodations laws, the 
choice of whether to segregate or not was left to the business operators. Unless a 
protester created a public disturbance (and they carefully avoided behavior that 
would risk this), police had to follow their lead. 
In the end, the police seemed to want what the lunch counter operators wanted: 
someone in authority to do something. The sit-ins led to volatile confrontations, and 
the police felt helpless watching them unfold day after day.88 Even if police would 
have liked to have acted to end the protests, their legal authority limited their ability 
to do so. Unlike the store operators, they had the incentives to act to diffuse these 
volatile situations. But short of a public disturbance, the operators held the authority 
to initiate the legal process.  
State-level politicians tended to be quicker and harsher in their condemnation 
of the sit-in movement than their local counterparts. Whereas elected officials in 
cities in the upper South often depended on the Black vote, this was much less the 
case when it came to state-level politicians, many of whom were elected with 
aggressive pro-segregationist platforms. For example, Georgia Governor Vandiver, 
who had come to office with promises of unwavering support for segregation and was 
elected on the strength of the rural vote89 (which held disproportionate sway over 
state-wide elections in the South because of the severe malapportionment in electoral 
districts90), denounced the statement of student leaders in Atlanta in support of the 
sit-ins as “calculated to breed dissatisfaction, discontent, discord, and evil.” 91 
Vandiver personally ordered the arrest of the Atlanta students who targeted the state 
capitol cafeteria92 and then issued a statement that described “these mass violations 
of State law and private property rights” as “subversive in character.”93 Louisiana 
Governor Earl K. Long denounced the protests as the work of “some radical outfit” 
and suggested that if the demonstrators “want to do any real good they should return 
to their native Africa.”94 In North Carolina, Governor Luther Hodges went on a letter-
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writing campaign urging the operators of lunch counters targeted by the sit-ins to 
press trespassing charges against the protesters.95 
As the sit-ins spread across the South, southern state legislatures pushed new 
criminal trespass laws to deal with the protests.96 These new trespass laws still 
required private initiative to set the legal process in motion, however. Police would 
only make an arrest after being contacted by the business manager and having the 
manager, in the presence of the police officer, indicate his refusal to serve the patron. 
State officials were “helpless” to enforce the law if store managers chose not to go 
through the necessary steps, complained the frustrated Georgia Attorney General, 
Eugene Cook, after Atlanta merchants and protesters negotiated a desegregation 
agreement in early 1961.97 Since the students were not listening to their calls to stop 
their protests, state-level officials had to rely on the lunch counter operators to defend 
their private property rights by calling upon the law. But, to the frustration of many 
a southern governor, the lunch counter operators refused to do what they wanted 
them to do. 
In the case of the sit-ins, law amplified underlying divisions among defenders 
of segregation, ultimately benefiting the movement. The misalignment of authority 
and incentives among those who stood opposed to the sit-ins created a situation in 
which the protests would explode across the South. 
 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE SIT-INS 
The history of the 1960 sit-in movement may offer some guidance to better 
understand how social justice activists can leverage law to advance their causes. 
One obvious lesson of the sit-ins is the surprising potential of legal uncertainty 
for social movement mobilization. 98  Lawyers interested in social reform work 
generally assess the strength of a cause based on the strength of the underlying legal 
claim. Hence, in 1960, civil rights lawyers were focused largely on implementing 
school desegregation and pursuing voting rights, two issues in which the law clearly 
was behind the cause of racial justice. The lawyer’s relative inattention to racial 
discrimination in public accommodations was based in their belief that the state 
action doctrine presented a significant, perhaps insuperable, obstacle to 
constitutional claims in this area. As I have described above, this legalistic 
assessment functioned as an invitation to the incipient student protest movement. 
The student protesters aimed their energies at a target that was in certain ways a 
fresh one, its vulnerabilities uncertain. Sympathizers lauded the creative tactics of 
the movement, praising the students for charting a new course toward racial equality. 
Thus, the sit-ins show that in social movement mobilization the law matters, 
but not always in obvious or predictable ways. A strong legal claim (a claim that is 
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98   I offer a more general, doctrine-focused take on this theme in SCHMIDT, supra note 1. 
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likely or even sure to win in court) does not necessarily make for an effective focal 
point for movement mobilization. It may be irrelevant. Or it may actually operate in 
ways that undermine movement mobilization. (For example, the NAACP’s 1954 
Supreme Court victory in Brown might have actually diverted the attention of some 
civil rights reformers away from grassroots activism for a time,99 contributing to the 
stalled situation that the sit-in protesters lashed out against in 1960.) Weak or 
uncertain legal claims can create opportunities. They can steer other activists in ways 
that create openings for new movement activism. They can encourage novel, less 
legalistic tactics. Under the right circumstances, legal uncertainty can be a good thing 
for social movement mobilization.100 
Because the legal issues were so fluid in the case of the sit-ins, civil rights 
lawyers were able to overcome their initial skepticism and join the battle the students 
had initiated. Civil rights lawyers declared at every turn that the students’ cause was 
based on a valid constitutional claim. For lawyers versed in constitutional doctrine, 
this claim was a call on the courts to reconsider the boundaries of the state action 
doctrine as it had been defined by longstanding precedent. Sympathizers of the 
student movement who were unfamiliar with these doctrinal complexities made 
much the same claim, although they more often assumed it was not a request to 
dramatically change existing law but simply a reaffirmation of the change the 
Supreme Court had already announced in Brown. Although wrong on the doctrinal 
details, this assertion that the students had not just a moral right but also a 
constitutional right to nondiscriminatory access to public accommodations elevated 
the issue, placing it alongside issues in which the courts were more open to accepting 
that racial nondiscrimination was indeed a constitutional mandate, such as public 
education and voting. Although the student movement never won its constitutional 
claim in the Supreme Court, the inclusion of a public accommodation provision in the 
landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act was understood by many at the time—and still 
today—to be an affirmation that the Constitution was indeed on the side of the sit-in 
protesters. The uncertain nature of the law surrounding the sit-ins allowed for a 
delicate dance with and against the law. In the end, this dance benefited the 
protesters and their cause. 
Another potential lesson from the sit-ins are the benefits of multiple paths for 
recognizing rights. For all its simplicity as an act of social protest, the sit-ins were a 
remarkably complex challenge to an array of private actors and public institutions, 
ranging from the local manager of a lunch counter to the justices of the United States 
Supreme Court. Challenging private and public actors can be disabling—it can allow 
for too many ways to oppose movement goals. But it also allows for different 
mechanisms of pressure to be applied. In the early 1960s, racial discrimination in 
public accommodations was challenged through direct-action protest, boycotts, 
constitutional litigation, and legislation (local, state, and federal). One set of 
arguments operated in the litigation context; another in the legislative arena; and 
another in the economic realm. In the case of the sit-ins, constitutional litigation was 
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ultimately a dead end; the legislative approach was successful, although it took time 
to make it happen at the federal level. The economic pressure approach was 
successful in the near term in places where legislative reform was not feasible. 
Finally, another lesson that can be extracted from this history of the sit-in 
movement is the benefit of opportunities for clear victories, even small ones. 
Campaigns for legal change are often quite ambitious. It is worth thinking of ways in 
which non-lawyers can participate—and can achieve something—in ways that are 
complementary to the larger litigation and lobbying efforts. The sit-ins gave student 
protesters this opportunity. As described above, there were many ways in which the 
protesters could achieve the satisfaction of victories. Even when these victories were 
small or symbolic—the temporary closing of a lunch counter, say—they were the 
kinds of achievements that energized the movement. Victories, however small, got 
them back out the next day and the day after that. Initially, civil rights lawyers were 
resistant to this element of the sit-ins.101 Thurgood Marshall himself at one point 
suggested to student protesters that since they had made their point and given the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund their test cases they could stop their protests.102 Yet 
eventually, they too came to recognize the synergy between the protest movement 
and their own litigation-centered efforts. 
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